Time for NATO to Retire?

Learning All the Wrong Lessons from Europe's Bloc-Politics

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently gave his farewell speech. The speech was intended to be a tribute to NATO and himself, instead it revealed why the military alliance as an outdated relic from the Cold War should retire.[1] The speech exposed an ideological and simplistic mindset in which conflicts occur because there are bad guys in the world, and security depends on the good guys arming themselves to the teeth and confronting the bad guys. Immersed with ideology to justify a hegemonic world order, there was zero recognition of the security competition in the international system. Our weapons are good, the weapons of our adversaries are bad. Dividing the world into good and evil is dangerous as war becomes the only path to peace, or as Stoltenberg argues about the Ukraine War: “weapons are the way to peace”.

How is security measured by NATO? Stoltenberg boasted that “we have strengthened our defences”, without assessing if this has resulted in heightened security. Stoltenberg celebrated that NATO went from “having zero to tens of thousands of combat-ready NATO soldiers on our Eastern flank”, without a word about how Russia will respond to NATO militarising its borders. Expansionism was presented as an objective of its own as “Montenegro, North Macedonia, Finland and Sweden joined our Alliance. And Ukraine is closer to NATO than ever before”. Given that NATO expansionism triggered the war in Ukraine, how will the end of neutrality in Europe impact peace? The failed ambition towards the end of the Cold War was to transition away from confrontational bloc politics, zero-sum politics, and Cold War mentality. Yet, the advancement of a military bloc is now seemingly the sole measurement of success for NATO.

Peacetime alliances

The modern world order is based on a balance of power in which alliances are useful to the extent they balance the hegemonic ambitions of an expansionist power. After the Cold War, NATO itself became an instrument of expansionism and hegemony. NATO preserved US dominance in Europe and the military bloc had to search for a new purpose to justify its own existence. NATO transitioned from a status-quo power to a revisionist power as its continued relevance relied on expansionism and military interventionism. The buzz phrase of the 1990s was that NATO had to go “out of area or out of business”. Today, NATO is an organisation that justifies its existence by the need to counter the security challenges caused by its own existence.

Peacetime alliances are problematic as they rely on external adversaries to preserve internal solidarity, which creates incentives for radicalising the “us” versus “them” mentality. NATO struggled with a lack of purpose when peace broke out in the 1990s, although Stoltenberg could now celebrate the renewed purpose and unity of NATO as war had returned to Europe. Peacetime alliances also creates entanglements as military alliances replace a state’s right to make war with a duty to make war.[2] Military alliances also encourage smaller states to maintain their historical grievances and embolden aggressive behaviour. For example, the former Prime Minister of Estonia, a country of 1.3 million people, feels comfortable calling for breaking up the Russian Federation into many smaller states as the US stands behind it. Instead of encouraging reconciliation, peacetime military alliances embrace the people who pursue historical justice and vengeance. Whenever a NATO member state considers to return to diplomacy or recognise the security concerns of the adversary, the demand for “alliance solidarity” is used to prevent peace from breaking out.

The lesson from history is that security competition is mitigated with inclusive security arrangements that pursue security with other member states, as opposed to exclusive alliances that pursue security against non-members. After Russia’s victory over Napoleon, Europe’s first collective security institution was established, the Concert of Europe (1815-1914), in which France as the defeated state was invited to have a seat at the table. This lesson was not followed after the First World War as peace relied on perpetuating the weakness of Germany with the Treaty of Versailles, which laid the foundations for the Second World War. However, after the Second World War, both Germany and France were brought into the same club to pursue security with each other rather than against each other.

The decision to abandon agreements such as the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) to form a pan-European security architecture after the Cold War, functioned as a second Treaty of Versailles in which peace in Europe would rely on perpetuating the weakness of Russia. Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defence, William Perry, recognised that NATO expansion was a betrayal of the post-Cold War peace, but explained that his colleagues in the Clinton administration did not care as Russia was weak and kept getting weaker. George Kennan, the architect of the US containment policy against the Soviet Union, criticised the decision to expand NATO as a reversal back to confrontational bloc politics: “Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom”.[3] In an interview with the New York Times, George Kennan outlined the folly and predicted the consequences of expansion:

“I think it is the beginning of a new cold war… There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves…. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are —but this is just wrong”.[4]

The success of NATO is also measured by the ability to expand the bloc politics of Europe to the wider world. Stoltenberg applauded NATO for the “deepened relations with countries in the Indo Pacific”, which is evidently intended to contain and confront China. Bloc politics was equated to freedom as Stoltenberg argued NATO “must not make the same mistake with China" as "freedom is more important than free trade”. NATO’s lesson from Europe is seemingly not that zero-sum bloc politics was advanced at the expense of an inclusive European security architecture, rather it was that the West allowed itself to have any dependence on Russia at all. Is it possible that incrementally moving militarised diving lines closer and closer to Russian borders was not a good recipe for security?

An Alternative Farewell Speech?

An alternative farewell speech should have been held by the former Prime Minister of Australia, Paul Keating. Last year, Keating commented on the goal to make NATO go global. In Keating’s words: “NATO’s continued existence after and at the end of the Cold War has already denied peaceful unity in broader Europe”.[5] Keating was thus fiercely opposed to expanding the model of European bloc politics and Cold War mentality to Asia as "Exporting that malicious poison to Asia would be akin to Asia welcoming the plague upon itself. With all of Asia’s recent development amid its long and latent poverty, that promise would be compromised by having anything to do with the militarism of Europe – and militarism egged on by the United States”. Regarding the man of the hour, Jens Stoltenberg, Keating opined:

“Of all the people on the international stage the supreme fool among them is Jens Stoltenberg, the current Secretary-General of NATO. Stoltenberg by instinct and by policy, is simply an accident on its way to happen… Stoltenberg conducts himself as an American agent more than he performs as a leader and spokesperson for European security.”

As Stoltenberg retires, is time to retire NATO as well?

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[1] NATO - Opinion: Transcript - German Marshall Fund event, Reflections on a Challenging Decade: A Farewell Conversation with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 19-Sep.-2024

[2] J.H. Herz, ‘Power politics and world organization’, The American Political Science Review, vol.36, no.6, 1942, p.1046-7.

[3] G.F., Kennan, ‘A Fateful Error’, The New York Times, 5 February 1997.

[4] T.L. Friedman, ‘Foreign Affairs; Now a Word From X.’, The New York Times, 2 May 1998.

[5] P. Keating. ‘NATO's provocative lurch eastward and the 'supreme fool' Jens Stoltenberg’, China Daily, 10 July 2023.