The Increase in Ukrainian Casualties
The Reason Why Military Losses Intensify for the Losing Side at the End of Wars
Ukrainian casualties and loss of military hardware are intensifying, which is shifting the attrition rates even further to Russia’s advantage. The rapid increase in losses with the losing side is a very common phenomenon toward the end of a war, with a common example being the spike in German casualties at the final stages of the Second World War.
In a war of attrition, the losses will naturally increase when the war machine has reached its breaking point. Soldiers have weaker strategic positions, there is a lack of resources, supply chains are not sufficiently defended, communications often break down, and there is a collapse in morale. Once the collapse begins, it often has a cascading effect. An early indicator of a cascading effect was when Ukraine began to struggle with air defence systems, which resulted in Russia being able to bring in its air force equipped with powerful glide bombs. Subsequently, holding strategic positions and avoiding high casualty rates became increasingly challenging and new problems began to emerge.
The Collapse has Begun
It appears that we have entered the final stages of the war due to the cascading effect. Ukraine is seeing its logistics break down, and there is a lack of weapons and ammunition that prevents soldiers from performing optimally.
The greatest challenge appears to be the lack of manpower, in which there are no good solutions. More aggressive mobilisation deprives society of important labour, it creates social upheaval as the public observes their family and fellow citizens being dragged off the streets and thrown into vans. Furthermore, the recruits receive less training and are much less motivated than the soldiers who volunteered at the beginning of the war. Simply put, a new army cannot be built in a rush. As a result, Ukraine began using and losing its best soldiers.
The Ukrainian frontlines experience a growing lack of military resources, reinforcements do not turn up, and communication with military command becomes less reliable. The increasingly difficult position on the front causes a spike in soldiers who defect and surrender, while even entire military companies have withdrawn from their positions without permission. Predictably, this unpredictability creates less cohesion along the frontline as unreliable soldiers can be a tremendous liability as the front lines do not hold.
With the Ukrainian frontlines breaking, troops find themselves encircled and their option is either to surrender or to pursue a disorganised withdrawal in which the retreating forces are exposed and can be knocked out by the Russian military. Incrementally, the Ukrainians find themselves with fewer strategic positions, supply lines are severed, there is an even greater shortage of military equipment and manpower, and morale continues to collapse. As the situation deteriorates, communication and coordination unavoidably suffer, as for example, Ukraine seemingly shot down its F-16 with a patriot missile.
The war has been lost, and with the writing on the wall, the Ukrainian army becomes more vulnerable to its officers striking a deal with Russia. Some are likely angered by a sense of betrayal as the US and NATO provoked the war and sabotaged the Istanbul peace agreements. The promise from the Americans and British was that Ukraine would receive all the weapons and assistance it needed to defeat Russia on the battlefield if Zelensky would reject the peace agreement and chose war. While there is no available evidence of Ukrainian officers defecting, it seems as if Russia’s intelligence and spy network has improved over the past weeks.
The Last-Ditch Gamble
Another common feature in a losing war is the desperation that encourages great risks in a last-ditch effort to turn everything around. The invasion of the Russian region of Kursk is a great example as most Ukrainian, Russian and Western observers initially seemed to agree that this was a great risk with a low chance of succeeding. However, the propaganda machine was thereafter turned on to ensure that the Western public will maintain their war enthusiasm and support for sending more weapons. Subsequently, journalists began reporting on successes of the Ukraine/NATO invasion of Kursk, with success measured mostly in terms of humiliating Putin or boosting morale among Ukrainian soldiers. Yet, the temporary victory in the information war eventually gives way to losses in the real world. Ukrainian troops and equipment were diverted away from well-prepared defensive lines in Donbas in favour of being exposed in the open on foreign territory.
In Donbas, the front lines are collapsing due to the lack of men and military equipment, and in Kursk there are massive casualties. The problem of high casualties was exacerbated by the lack of reliable supply lines for weapons and fuel in Kursk, while engineering equipment could not be sent in to dig in at the new positions within Russian territory. The few remaining air defence systems and HIMARS had to be brought much closer to the border, which could then be detected more easily by Russian surveillance and thus destroyed by missiles and drones. Huge amounts of military resources were squandered on territory with hardly any strategic value, which Ukraine will not be able to hold. The inability to pull out of Kursk compels Ukraine to double down on failure and the situation goes from bad to worse.
As the collapse intensifies, the winning side in a war typically increases its pressure. Russia has increased its deep missile strikes, and its military is pushing through what used to be well-defended front lines. Russia's more powerful bombing campaign is also motivated by retaliation for the invasion of Kursk and to restore its deterrence by warning NATO against further escalations. Furthermore, Russia has retaliated by further destroying Ukraine’s energy network which reduces the mobility of the military, and reduces the industrial production and the ability to get through the next winter. Millions of Ukrainian civilians who are suffering greatly under these deteriorating conditions will likely leave the country when winter approaches, a humanitarian disaster that will bring further problems to both Ukraine and Europe.
A Proxy War: How Will NATO Respond to Defeat?
What makes the Ukraine War different from many other wars, is that this is a proxy war in which NATO uses Ukrainians to fight Russia. The uncertain and unpredictable variable is therefore how NATO will react as it loses its war against Russia. NATO is already providing weapons, ammunition, training, intelligence, target selection, war planning, managing complex weapon systems, and sending Western mercenaries. NATO’s support for strikes inside Russian territory and the invasion of Russian territory has already taken us to the brink of a direct war. The Americans appear to get ready to cut their losses and instead shift focus on a wider war in the Middle East or confronting China, but the Europeans have bet everything on defeating Russia militarily. In terms of capabilities, it is the US that matters.
There are simply no good solutions anymore. The only two options are to either negotiate or get increasingly involved in direct fighting. NATO has largely rejected diplomacy and placed itself in a rhetorical trap in which victory is the only acceptable outcome, and the EU even punishes member states such as Hungary that attempt to restore diplomacy and negotiations with Russia. However, more direct NATO involvement will likely trigger a direct war with Russia, the world’s largest nuclear power, and it is unclear what a “victory” would look like that would not first trigger a nuclear exchange.
This is the time to restore diplomacy and return to negotiations, although it will take some time to reverse the propaganda of the past decade and prepare the public for a new narrative. Much like in Afghanistan, the political-media elites will reassure us that we are winning, until we flee in a disorganised manner with people falling off planes.
I spoke briefly about the rising Ukrainian casualties on WION
Glen provides good analysis, usually. And in the this article, the overall assessment is correct but number of the details and language about the actual military reasons of Zelensky's regime collapsing are rather from a civilian, than from a professional military analyst.
The main points, of why Russia is winning are:
Russia was always going to win, as we and many others said in February 22, because of so many advantages it has.
Russia never lost a such a big war near, or at home..and Ukraine is home for Russia.
Nato is a far weaker force than Russia, with shiny toys but not many capable, proven weapons on the battlefield. We see this constantly when the two forces are in dug in big fights, like Bakhmut, Avdivka, Mariopol, whole Zelensky counter..etc, all won convincingly by Russia, battles which happened much earlier than 'now', contrary to Glen's argument.
And it was in those battles that the Nato Zelensky ability to sustain the fight was exposed..it was when the Nato army was destroyed..not now. Now, the Russian forces are cleaning up the last few bits of resistance.
Glen is correct that the US is shifting interest from Zelensky...but wrong, arguing that the US is looking for a military fight with China. It's rather, the US has lost much power in the Pacific, and everywhere else in the world...and thus, trying to save a few of it's allies in South East Asia and the Pacific. But war against China, definitely NOT. As Washington knows full well, that it will have to fight against both, China and Russia, in their own Asian, Pacific backyard. And Russia has the largest, most modern, capable submarine Navy. Today, war at sea is all about submarine capabilities. Aircraft carriers, an area of US dominance, is only good for colonial wars, against countries that don't have military capabilities.
As for Europe, yes, Glen is correct..now it finds itself in the cold having to fight against the Russian Federation in Ukraine. But Europe is no match against Russia..it doesn't have what it takes to win...not even resist Russian military power. This is a repeat of 1805 and 1942, when most of Europe was better united against Russia, so it forced these big wars, and lost them both. In both cases, Russia started slow, with much smaller military...but as the Russians are masters of defensive wars, they slowly gained the upper hand, and gained control of fighting.
In such big wars, it's all about obtaining that CONTROL of the flight. And that's why Russia won both, against the multi European force of Napoleon..and army with more Germanic than French soldiers; and then in ww2 Russia obtained total control again, slowly to begin with, as it has to be built up properly in all sectors of the flighting machine, and then spend up when total fighting control was achieved. Again, in ww2, The Soviet/Russian military defeated a huge multinational European force of many countries fighting under the Nazi flag. The list is too long to list here...but available online.
Today in Ukraine, Russia knew from the very start in Feb.22, that again it's all about gaining that fight control on the battlefield. And again, Russia started from long way behind, because Kiev Nato military had been preparing since 2014...whilst Russia had still a Peace time military in Feb22. But that never worried the Russians...as they know that their military methodology works very well, in all sectors of the physical, the psychological, the political.
The Psychology of letting the enemy do well initially, but then hitting them back hard, works so well... always.
Armies that do well initially, usually lose. That's the history of war, between equal powers.
But right now, as in the last 300 years, no country has even come close to Russian military power. That's what the record says...not us, or anybody else.
Remember... It's always about who understands the total value of CONTROL OF THE FIGHT...and then can apply in practice on the battlefield. All the other stuff, and arguments are just details.
Great article, thank you. What’s troubling me is what’s the exit ramp that Russia can offer the Europeans? Can’t see them accepting present loss of face with their electorates