The Budapest Memorandum: The Fake Narrative Supporting a Long War in Ukraine

Professor Glenn Diesen

Narratives have been constructed to support a long war in Ukraine. For example, the narrative of an “unprovoked invasion” was important to criminalise diplomacy as the premise suggests negotiations would reward Russian military adventurism and embolden further Russian aggression. Meanwhile, NATO escalating the war creates costs that outweigh the benefits to Russia.

Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum is a key narrative that supports a long war. It is constantly referenced as a reason why Russia cannot be trusted to abide by a peace agreement, and why the war must keep going. The argument is that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in return for security guarantees for its territorial integrity. Russia’s breach of this agreement suggests it cannot be trusted and that the only reliable security guarantees must come from NATO membership. Furthermore, the West must continue to send weapons to Ukraine to honour the security guarantees of the Budapest Memorandum.

In February 2022, a few days before the Russian invasion, Zelensky referred to the Budapest Memorandum: “Ukraine has received security guarantees for abandoning the world's third nuclear capability. We don't have that weapon. We also have no security.” The Budapest Memorandum was again used by Zelensky in October 2024 to support the argument that Ukraine must either have NATO or nukes: “Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons, and then it will be a defence for us, or Ukraine will be in NATO”.

This article presents facts and arguments that challenge the false narrative of the Budapest Memorandum, which aims to delegitimise diplomacy. Criticising the narrative of the Budapest Memorandum does not entail “legitimising” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which is a common tactic to smear and censor criticism against the narratives supporting a long war.

No Security Guarantees and No Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons

In December 1994, the US, UK, and Russia met in the Hungarian capital and offered security commitments in three separate agreements with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. These three countries agreed to relinquish the nuclear weapons that had been left on their territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in return, the US, UK and Russia offered commitments to not undermine their security.

The Budapest Memorandum does not offer any security “guarantees”, rather it provides “assurances”. Former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, who was part of the US negotiation team in 1994, argues the US was explicit that “guarantees” should not be confused with “assurances”. Pifer also confirms this was understood by both the Ukrainians and the Russians:

“American officials decided the assurances would have to be packaged in a document that was not legally-binding. Neither the Bush nor Clinton administrations wanted a legal treaty that would have to be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. State Department lawyers thus took careful interest in the actual language, in order to keep the commitments of a political nature. U.S. officials also continually used the term “assurances” instead of “guarantees,” as the latter implied a deeper, even legally-binding commitment of the kind that the United States extended to its NATO allies”.[1]

Ukraine also did not have any nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons in question were former Soviet nuclear weapons that were stationed in Ukraine, but under the control of Moscow. Kiev did not and could not operate or maintain these weapons, which is usually left out of the narrative. Furthermore, in the Minsk agreement of 1991, Ukraine had already committed itself to the “destruction of nuclear weapons” on its territory.[2]

The Not-So-Sacred Memorandum

The Budapest Memorandum outlined key principles such as “to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind”, and to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine”. In a display of cherry-picking, NATO countries constantly ignore the first commitment but constantly refer to the second commitment.

The US claims its use of economic coercion and violation of Ukrainian sovereignty was in support of democracy and human rights as opposed to advancing its own interests. Thus, the US freed itself from its commitments under the Budapest Memorandum. Under the so-called rules-based international order, the US and its allies claim the prerogative to exempt themselves from international law, norms and agreements under the guise of supporting humanitarian law and liberal democratic norms.[3]

When the US imposed sanctions on Belarus in 2013, Washington explicitly stated that the Budapest Memorandum was not legally binding and that US actions were exempted as the US was allegedly promoting human rights:

“Although the Memorandum is not legally binding, we take these political commitments seriously and do not believe any U.S. sanctions, whether imposed because of human rights or non-proliferation concerns, are inconsistent with our commitments to Belarus under the Memorandum or undermine them. Rather, sanctions are aimed at securing the human rights of Belarusians and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other illicit activities, not at gaining any advantage for the United States”.[4]

The Western-backed coup in 2014 had been an even more blatant violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. The West interfered in the domestic affairs of Ukraine, imposed economic sanctions, and finally toppled the Ukrainian president to pull the country into NATO’s orbit. The commitments under the Budapest Memorandum were cast aside as the West claimed to support a “democratic revolution”, despite being an unconstitutional coup that did not even enjoy majority support from the Ukrainians and only a small minority of Ukrainians supported NATO membership.

International law imposes rules and mutual constraints that limit foreign policy flexibility, but in return deliver reciprocity and thus predictability. Once the West freed itself from mutual constraints in the Budapest Memorandum, Russia also abandoned it. US Ambassador Jack Matlock who participated in negotiating an end to the Cold War, questions the validity of the Budapest Memorandum after the coup in 2014. According to Matlock, the principle in international law of rebus sic stantibus means that agreements should be upheld “provided things remain the same”. Matlock argues that Russia “strictly observed its obligations in the Budapest Memorandum for 13 years” even as NATO expanded towards its borders, although the coup of 2014 created “a radically different international situation”. Matlock thus concludes that Russia was “entitled to ignore the earlier agreement”.[5]

Learning the right lessons

An honest assessment of why the Budapest Memorandum collapsed is important to assess how new agreements can be improved. NATO’s demand for hegemony in Europe and rejection of a common European security architecture inevitably led to the collapse of common agreements as the West would no longer accept the principle of mutual constraints and obligations. Liberal hegemony entailed that the West could exempt itself from international law and agreements, while Russia would still abide by them. The narrative of Ukrainian nuclear weapons, security guarantees, and ignoring the US and UK violation of the Budapest Memorandum serves the purpose of sowing distrust in any future security agreements with Russia. A mutually beneficial peace is possible if we first return to the truth.

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[1] S. Pifer, 2011. The Trilater Proce The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Arms Control Series, Paper 6, May 2011, p.17. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_trilateral_process_pifer.pdf

[2] Agreement on Strategic Forces Concluded between the 11 members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 30, 1991. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/START/documents/strategicforces91.htm

[3] G. Diesen, ‘The Case for Dismantling the Rules-Based International Order, Substack, 23 December 2024.

[4] US Embassy in Belarus, ‘Belarus: Budapest Memorandum’, U.S. Embassy in Minsk, 12 April 2013.

[5] J. Matlock, ‘Ambassador Jack Matlock on Ukraine, Russia, and the West’s Mistakes’, Nuova Rivista Storica