How Europe’s New Political Class Began Rejecting Reality

Glenn Diesen

Russia considers NATO’s incursion into Ukraine to be an existential threat, and NATO has openly stated its intention to make Ukraine a member state after the war. Without a political settlement that restores Ukraine’s neutrality, Russia will therefore likely annex the strategic territories it cannot accept ending up under NATO control and then turn what remains of Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state. As the war is being lost, the rational policy for the Europeans would therefore be to offer an agreement based on ending NATO’s eastward expansion to save Ukrainian lives, territory and the nation itself. Yet, no European leader has been able to even suggest such a solution publicly. Why?

Present the average European politician, journalist or academic with the following thought experiment: If you were an advisor to the Kremlin, what would be your advice to Russia if there are no negotiations to resolve the Ukraine War? Most would feel morally compelled to give ridiculous answers such as advising the Kremlin to capitulate and withdraw, even if Russia is on the cusp of victory. Any impulse to adhere to reason and address Russia’s security concerns would likely be deterred by the threat of being shamed for “legitimising” Russia’s invasion.

What explains the decline of strategic thinking, pragmatism and rationality in European politics?

Europe’s Reality as a Social Construction

The political class that emerged in Europe after the Cold War have become excessively ideological and committed to narratives to socially construct new realities. The Europeans embrace of postmodernism entails questioning the existence of objective reality as our understanding of reality is shaped by language, culture and unique historical perspectives. The postmodernists therefore often seek to change narratives and language as a source of political power. If reality is a social construction, then the grand narratives can be more important than facts. Indeed, ideological narratives must be defended from inconvenient facts.

The European project had the benign intentions of creating a common liberal democratic European identity that would transcend the divisive national rivalry and power politics of the past. The relevance of objective reality is contested, and narratives about reality are believed to reflect power structures that can be dismantled and reorganised.

The prevalence of constructivism and focus on “speech acts” in the EU has led to the belief that even using realist analysis and discussing competing national interests entail legitimising realpolitik and thus socially constructing a more dangerous reality. Speech acts refer to the use of language as a source of power by constructing political realities and influencing outcomes. By reducing the focus on security competition in the international system, it is assumed that power politics can be mitigated.

Is it possible to socially construct a new reality? Do we transcend security competition by not addressing it or do we neglect the responsible management of security competition. Can we transcend national rivalries by focusing on common values or does the neglect of national interests result in decline?

Socially Constructing a New Europe

The concept of the “rhetorical trap” explains how the EU reached a consensus to offer membership to Central and Eastern European states when it was not in the self-interest of all EU member states to do so. The rhetorical trap was set by first having member states accept the ideological premise that the legitimacy of the EU project was based on the integration of liberal democratic states. By appealing to the values and norms as the foundation the EU, a rhetorical trap was set as the sense of moral obligation shamed EU member states from vetoing the enlargement process. The use of language and framing could thus influence European states to not act in their own interests as they were shamed into compliance.

Schimmelfennig, who introduced the concept of the rhetorical trap, argues that “politics is a struggle over legitimacy, and this struggle is fought out with rhetorical arguments”.[1] The rhetorical trap simplifies a complex issue into a binary choice of either supporting the enlargement process or betraying liberal democratic ideals. The moral framing shuts down important discussions about the potential downsides of accepting new members and how to address these challenges in the best way. Dissent could be crushed as framing the issue as a moral imperative meant that those who even questioned the moral framing could be accused of undermining the sacred values that uphold the legitimacy of the entire European project.

The concept of “Euro-speak” entails using emotional rhetoric to legitimise an EU-centric understanding of Europe that de-legitimises alternative concepts of Europe. Centralising decision-making and transferring power from elected parliaments to Brussels is typically referred to as “European integration”, “more Europe”, or “ever-closer Union”. Neighbouring non-member states that adhere to the EU’s external governance are making the “European choice”, confirming their “European perspective”, and embracing “shared values”. Dissent can be delegitimised as “populism”, “nationalism”, “Euro-phobia” and “anti-Europeanism”, which undermines the “common voice”, “solidarity” and the “European dream”.

The language has also changed in terms of how the West asserts power in the world. Torture is “enhanced interrogation techniques”, gunboat diplomacy is “freedom of navigation”, dominance is “negotiations from a position of strength”, subversion is “democracy promotion”, coup is “democratic revolution”, invasion is “humanitarian intervention”, secession is “self-determination”, propaganda is “public diplomacy”, censorship is “content moderation”, and the more recent example of China competitive advantage that is labelled “over-capacity”. George Orwell’s concept of Newspeak entailed constraining language to the point it became impossible to express dissent.

NATO and the EU: Redividing Europe or “European Integration”

Western leaders initially recognised that abandoning an inclusive pan-European security architecture by expanding NATO and the EU would likely provoke another Cold War. The predictable consequence of constructing a new Europe without Russia would be to redivide the continent and then fight over where the new dividing lines should be drawn.

President Bill Clinton cautioned in January 1994 that NATO expansion risked to “draw a new line between East and West that could create a self-fulfilling prophecy of future confrontation”.[2] Clinton’s Secretary of Defence, William Perry, even considered resigning in opposition to expanding NATO. Perry noted that most people in the administration knew the betrayal would create conflicts with Russia, yet they believed it did not matter as Russia was weak.[3] George Kennan, Jack Matlock and a multitude of American political leaders also framed it as a betrayal against Russia and warned against redividing Europe. These concerns were also shared by many European leaders.

What happened to the discourse and warnings about instigating another Cold War? The narrative of the EU and NATO as a “force for good” that advance liberal democratic values had to be defended against the “outdated” narrative of power politics. Russian criticism of reviving the zero-sum security architecture of bloc politics was presented as evidence of Russia’s “zero-sum mentality”. Russia’s inability to recognise that NATO and the EU were positive-sum actors that transcend power politics allegedly revealed Russia’s inability to overcome the dangerous mindset of realpolitik, which was caused by Russia’s enduring authoritarianism and great power ambitions. The EU was merely constructing a “ring of friends”, while Russia allegedly demanded “spheres of influence”.

Russia was presented with the dilemma of either embracing the role of an apprentice aiming to join the civilised world by accepting NATO’s dominant role as a force for good, or Russia could resist NATO’s expansionism and “out-of-area missions” but then be treated as a dangerous force to be contained. Either way, Russia would not have a seat at the table in Europe. Liberal democratic tropes justified why the largest state in Europe should eventually be the only state without representation.

The expansion of NATO and the EU as exclusive blocs also imposes an “us-or-them” dilemma on the deeply divided societies in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Yet, rather than recognising the predictable destabilisation of divided societies in a divided Europe, it is presented as positive-sum “European integration” despite the implicit decoupling from Russia. Societies prioritising closer relations with Russia rather than NATO and the EU are delegitimised for rejecting democracy while their leaders are dismissed as authoritarian “Putinists” who deprive their people of their European dream.

The moral framing of the world convinced European leaders to support a coup to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit. It was common knowledge that only a small minority of Ukrainians desired NATO membership and that it would likely trigger a war, yet liberal democratic rhetoric still convinced European leaders to ignore reality and supporting disastrous policies. Common sense could be shamed.

Western political leaders, journalists and academics seeking to mitigate the security competition by addressing Russia’s legitimate security concerns are similarly accused of carrying water for Putin, repeating Kremlin talking points, “legitimising” Russian policies, and undermining liberal democracy. With the binary moral framing of good versus evil, intellectual pluralism and dissent are castigated as immoral.

Besides being plagued by war, Europe is also undergoing economic decline. The Europeans are buying Russian energy through India as an intermediary as they are morally obliged to follow failed sanctions. The virtue-signalling contributes to European industries becoming less competitive. The de-industrialisation of Europe is also caused by the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines, yet the event that is destroying decades of industrial development is memory-holed as the only two suspects are the US and Ukraine. Furthermore, the US offers subsidies to the subsequent uncompetitive European industries if they relocate across the Atlantic. In the absence of acceptable narratives, the Europeans simply keep silent and do not defend their national interests. The narrative of liberal democracies united by values rather than divided by competing interests must be defended from inconvenient facts.

Diplomacy, Neutrality & the Virtue of War

Diplomacy does not conform with the constructivist effort to socially construct a new reality. The point of departure in international security is the security competition in which efforts to increase the security of a state can decrease the security of another. Diplomacy entails enhancing mutual understanding and pursuing compromise to mitigate the security competition.

The social constructivists often consider diplomacy to be problematic as it “legitimises” the security competition that recognises NATO can undermine legitimate Russian security interests. Furthermore, it risks legitimising the opponent and creating a moral equivalency between Western states and Russia. The European elites believe that legitimise outdated and dangerous concepts of power politics by engaging in mutual understanding. The absurd conviction that negotiation is “appeasement” has become normalised in Europe.

Diplomacy therefore has been reimagined as a relationship between a subject and an object, between a teacher and a student. In this relationship, NATO and the EU consider their role as “socialising” other states. As a civilising teacher, the Enlightened West uses diplomacy as a pedagogic instrument in which states are “punished” or “rewarded” by their preparedness to accept unilateral concessions. While diplomacy historically has been imperative during times of crisis, the European elites believe they must instead punish “bad behaviour” by suspending diplomacy once a crisis breaks out. Meeting with opponents during crises runs the risk of legitimising them.

Neutrality was until recently considered a moral stance that mitigates security competition and enables a state to serve as a mediator rather than becoming entangled and escalating conflicts. In a struggle between good and evil, neutrality is also deemed to be immoral. The belt of neutral states that existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries has now been dismantled and even war becomes a virtuous defence of moral principles.

How to Restore Rationality & Correct the Post-Cold War Mistakes?

The failure to establish a mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement that would remove the dividing lines in Europe and enhance indivisible security has resulted in a predictable catastrophe. Yet, course correction requires nothing less than reconsidering the policies of the past 30 years and the concept of Europe at a moment when animosity is rampant on both sides. The European project was envisioned as the embodiment of Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis and an entire political class has based their legitimacy on conforming to the idea that developing a Europe without Russia was a recipe for peace and stability.

Does Europe have the rationality, political imagination and courage to critically assess its own mistakes and contribution to the current crisis, or will all criticism continue to be denounced as a threat to liberal democracy?

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[1] Schimmelfennig, Frank, 2003. The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and rhetoric, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, page 208.

[2] B. Clinton, ‘Remarks to Multinational Audience of Future Leaders of Europe’, US Diplomatic Mission to Germany, 9 January 1994.

[3] J. Borger, ‘Russian hostility 'partly caused by west', claims former US defence head’, The Guardian, 9 March 2016.