Collapse of Kursk: Narratives versus Reality

Prof. Glenn Diesen

The Ukrainian army's invasion of Kursk, backed by NATO, likely had rational and tangible objectives such seizing the Kursk nuclear power plant, creating a buffer zone, diverting Russian troops, and giving Ukraine a bargaining chip in future negotiations. However, it was also a battle for narratives. Exploring why the military operation failed also provides some lessons for why the war to control the narrative failed.

A War of Narratives

In September 2024, MI6 Chief Richard Moore and CIA Chief William Burns met, and both commented on the achievements with the invasion of Kursk. Both the intelligence chiefs noted the importance of changing the narrative. Moore argued: “I think it’s typically audacious and bold on the part of the Ukrainians to try and change the game in a way. I think they have to a degree changed the narrative around this”. Burns: “I think what these events have done, the Kursk offensive most recently, is to put a dent in that narrative”. The media also obsessed about the objective to humiliate Putin to weaken his position within Russia.

The Germans focused on the psychological effects and narrative from the invasion of Kursk. German Bundeswehr Major General Christian Freuding suggested a key objective for the invasion of Kursk was to increase the morale of Ukrainians, to demoralise the Russians, and boost the war enthusiasm in the West to maintain public support for funding the war. The German Major General noted that foreign troops were back on Russian soil for the first time since the invasion by Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and this was expected to have a devastating psychological effect on the Russians.

Retired German General Klaus Wittmann also referred to the historical relevance of Kursk in terms of Nazi Germany’s invasion during the Second World War, and this is where the Russian leadership are now humiliated. General Wittman criticised Western restrictions on weapons supplied for the invasion of Russian territory and urged that the West’s fear of escalation must stop.

The assumption that Russia would be humiliated proved to be flawed. What most Russians considered to be a war to prevent NATO’s incursion into Ukraine became a war of liberation, which unified the country to a greater extent. The historical memory of Kursk as a key battlefield in the Second World War also augmented the solidarity and preparedness to fight. Furthermore, it was evident that such a large military operation would not have been launched without the approval and support of NATO countries, which provide the weapons, training, intelligence, war planning, and target selections. For many Russians, Putin’s warnings about a NATO-backed attack on Russia with Ukraine as a proxy were seem to have been proven right.

The Second World War memory that the German military leadership thought it was a good idea to invoke for psychological warfare also backfired. One of the NATO-backed Ukrainian battallions that participated in the invasion of Kursk was the Nachtigall Battalion, which was named after Nazi Germany’s Nachtigall Battalion. The Kremlin’s narrative of NATO-backed fascists that had hijacked Ukraine and started the war in 2014 was also seen by many Russians to have been proven.

Over the next months, Russian TV screens provided imagery of Ukrainian invasion soldiers kidnapping civilians and committing war crimes, followed by commentary by a very supportive Western military and media.

Reality versus Narratives

Kursk was a costly military operation, as Ukraine took huge casualties and lost much military equipment. Ukrainian troops had to leave their fortified position and were put in the open, their supply lines were more exposed the deeper they advanced into Russia, and there was a lack of engineering equipment that could be brought into Russia to prepare their positions. Furthermore, the troops used in the Kursk operation were drawn from Ukraine’s well-fortified position in Donbas, which led to a collapse along that strategic frontline.

Sacrificing men and equipment is especially dangerous in a war of attrition, as the objective is to exhaust the enemy. In early 2022, the US and UK had convinced Zelensky to walk away from the Istanbul peace negotiations in return for weapons to fight and defeat Russia in a long war. Furthermore, NATO boycotted all diplomacy for the next three years, which meant that the war could only be resolved on the battlefield. In a war to the last soldier, military resources should be focused on where the attrition rates are favourable. Accepting high casualties to conquer non-strategic territory that cannot be held was a foolish strategy.

Narrative control and propaganda are important components of war, and even PR battles are important to the extent that they result in higher military recruitment in Ukraine and more willingness by NATO countries to send money and weapons. The Western political-media establishment gets excited and more committed when there are territorial victories by Ukraine. The Western public could lose interest in the Ukraine War without any territorial advancements, which was especially a problem when Project Ukraine had to compete with Gaza for attention.

However, the dangerous priority of narratives above reality is also an indication of how NATO countries have been trapped by their own propaganda. Most sensible military analysts must have known the invasion of Kursk would likely end in catastrophe, yet analysis on how to achieve victory are restrained by the propaganda war. It is obligatory in the West to “stand with Ukraine”, which can only be translated into applauding and celebrating the destructive policies of Zelensky. Treating Russian-speakers as second-class citizens, purging the political opposition, media and the Orthodox Church alienated large parts of the population to the extent that it undermined the ability to fight, yet to criticise Zelensky is heresy in the West. The predictably disastrous invasion of Kursk similarly had to be met with uncritical applause.

The End of the Kursk Occupation

Russia’s approach to the invasion of Kursk was to first stabilise the front line and then inflict losses on the poorly defended Ukrainian army. Ukraine’s narrative victory became a narrative trap as Zelensky could not pull out of Kursk even as the high losses became unsustainable. Many of Ukraine’s best soldiers were sent into the Kursk cauldron, and as a consequence the wider collapse of the Ukrainian army intensified. With possible upcoming negotiations, Russia is now closing the pocket and restoring control over its territory.

New narratives must subsequently be constructed to explain the loss of Kursk without losing public support for continued war. The loss will likely be blamed on Trump or insufficient Western military support. Such narratives will prevail as the Western public has not received any information about what has transpired in Kursk over the previous months.